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Foreword 
Let’s imagine that, despite the lack of any all-encompassing picture, an 
abstract mathematical structure guides our (technological) activities more 
efficiently than ever, possibly assisted by a set of clumsy, incomplete, 
ancillary pictures. In this new situation, the usual hierarchy of knowledge 
would be put upside down. Unlike the standard order of priorities, situation-
centered practical knowledge would be given precedence over theoretical 
knowledge associated with elaborate unified representations; in the same way 
as, in Husserl’s Crisis of the European Science, the life-world is given 
precedence over theoretical “substructions”. Here, instead of construing 
representation as an accomplished phase of knowledge beyond the primitive 
embodied adaptation to a changing pattern of phenomena, one would see 
representation as an optional instrument that is sometimes used in highly 
advanced forms of embodied fitness. As for mathematical formalisms, they 
would no longer be taken for a structural image of the actual world, but rather 
understood as a systematic inventory of our most precise possibilities of bodily 
action in response to a varying phenomenal landscape (along with Jean 
Piaget’s genetic psychology or Andrew Pickering’s neo-pragmatism). The 
Platonician dream of knowing natural forms would be dispelled by the 
realization that the theories of mathematical physics are variants of a 
formalized know-how. 
 
1. Quantum physics as formalized know-how: what are the resistances? 
In the eyes of any lucid and unprejudiced thinker, it is obvious that quantum 
physics is a perfect instantiation of this kind of post-classical conception of 
knowledge. In quantum physics, it has soon been suspected (especially by 
Niels Bohr) that a fully coherent all-encompassing representation might well 
be out of reach. At most, one can provide a mathematical scheme that has the 
mental function of a “representation” without pretending to be literally a 
 





representation of the world (Schrödinger 1951, p. 40; Bitbol 1996 p. 29). The 
reason of this apparent limitation of quantum physics is clear to almost 
anyone. It is the contextuality of micro-properties, the fact that micro-
properties cannot be disentangled from the material and bodily context of their 
manifestation. Due to contextuality, no independent domain of properties and 
entities can properly be defined, let alone represented. But physicists soon 
realized that the lack of a unified representation and the unbreachable 
contextuality of properties were absolutely no hindrance to the efficiency of 
the mathematical scheme of the theory. They then used it with amazing 
success, as a universal chart of microphysical know-how. 
It is thus prima facie surprising that, for nearly one century, there has been 
continuous struggle against those unexpected but strong conclusions. Many 
scientists felt that lacking a unified and consistent narrative about the world is 
tantamount to falling into non-sense. And they desperately attempted to 
overcome what they saw as a failure.  
Very few researchers tried the opposite strategy that consists in pushing 
Bohr’s approach to its ultimate consequences, thus making sense of the 
collapse of representations, and looking for a new process of sense-making 
below the level of representations; say at the level of the phenomenology of 
perception and action. Very few of them decided to explore the surface of 
micro-phenomena, and to make sense of their being limited to this so-called 
surface, rather than trying desperately to tell a tale about the elusive depths 
hidden behind phenomena. For some time, I had the feeling that this stubborn 
attitude, this resistance against the radical epistemological lesson of quantum 
physics, is a constitutive feature of our Western ethos.  
Why, if not because of a deeply entrenched cultural obstacle, would a new 
conception of knowledge that makes sense of our most advanced physical 
theory not be more widely accepted? Why does it so often find itself opposed 
by the indignant reactions of certain physicists who reproach it with “betraying 
the ideal of science” (Stengers 1997). Why do some mathematicians accuse 
quantum theory of being unacceptable or even “scandalous” (Thom 1993)? 
Why, even when indignation is absent, does the exposition of the minimalist 
conception of quantum theory give rise to a resigned silence which manifestly 
expresses a profound disappointment?  
This might be due to the fact we are dealing with a breach of several tacit 
contracts of our civilization. One of these is a fairly recent contract, signed at 
the end of the sixteenth century, between the desire for a metaphysical 
breakthrough that motivates scholars, and the craftsmen’s need for 
technological improvement (Scheler 1993). There is also a much older 
contract, dating back to ancient Greece, which has made it an obligation to 
look for a principle of understanding superficial appearances in the inmost 
depths of things (Schrödinger 1954), and to seek there the changeless source 




If scientific progress does not help our gaze to penetrate into the very heart of 
material bodies, and to definitively guarantee technological effectiveness by 
laying bare their secret, what is the point of it? If the progress of knowledge 
amounts merely to a kaleidoscopic deployment of the phenomenal skin of 
things, instead of opening up an insight into their very flesh and marrow, does 
it not seem vain? One may recall that the entities which, in the history of 
science, were given the title of “realities behind appearances”, have turned out 
to be: (1) other appearances (or phenomena) revealed by a new approach or 
(2) mathematical idealities which express some invariants of the said 
phenomena. However, this simple reminder is not enough. The “dream of 
reason” pursues its course; this same dream that Kant upheld at the beginning 
of his quest, before discarding it in his critical philosophy: the dream of 
grasping by thought a “representation of things as they are” (Kant [1770] 
2004). 
2.The new understanding of quantum mechanics 
But several recent debates and ideas in the philosophy of quantum mechanics 
suggest, to my delight, that things are now changing at a fast pace. Several 
new philosophical readings of quantum physics all point in the same direction, 
the direction of full recognition of the fact that the quantum revolution is 
above all a revolution in our conception of knowledge. Apart from Asher 
Peres’ remarkable “no-interpretation” of quantum theories, which radicalizes 
the so-called Copenhagen interpretation, the forerunner of this new trend was 
probably the information-theoretic interpretation of Anton Zeilinger and his 
school. According to this interpretation, the information made available by 
experiments exhausts “reality”; and the formalism of quantum theories is 
derivable (to a certain extent) from a principle of limitation of the information 
that can be extracted from each system. As for this principle of limitation, it is 
an operational formulation of the widely acknowledged contextuality of micro-
properties. From this kind of derivation, or “reconstruction” (Grinbaum, 
2007), it becomes clear that quantum theories are not to be understood as an 
indirect representation of some reality beyond the phenomenal level of 
experimental information, but as a direct expression of some in-principle 
bounds of the availability of this information.  
Recent developments in the use of quantum theories can be seen as an implicit 
confirmation of the relevance of an information-theoretic reading. One case is 
especially striking: it is a recent generalization of quantum theory that applies 
to several domains of the human sciences (Bruza et al. 2009a, Bitbol 2009) 
such as decision theory, semantics, and the psychology of perception. This 
application of quantum theory to the human sciences shows that no matter 
who or what responds (human beings or things), the probabilistic structure that 
is to be used to anticipate the responses is roughly similar. A set of human 
beings making choices that depend on the options which are presented to 
them, and on the order of the decisions to be taken, behaves to a certain extent 




(Zwirn 2009). In particular, a set of speakers who must make a decision 
concerning the meaning of a polysemic word, according to the propositional 
contexts, violate the Bell inequalities (Bell 1987), just as a set of 
microparticles do (Bruza et al. 2009a, b). There is nothing shocking about the 
fact that it should be so. For this implies strictly nothing about some alleged 
similarity between electrons and humans at the level of their profound being. 
There is only an isomorphism between the possibilities of epistemological 
access to electrons and to humans: a rough isomorphism of their phenomenal 
reactions to being solicited, and of their informational dispositions.  
True, the amount of contextuality is not necessarily identical in both situations, 
namely in physics and in the human sciences (Aerts & Sozzo, 2014). A 
quantitative assessment of their discrepancy with respect to classical, non-
contextual, predictions, can even be given by comparing their respective 
deviations from the gold standard of the original Bell’s inequalities. For 
standard quantum mechanics, the maximal value of this deviation is given by 
the “Tsirelson bound” (Tsirelson, 1987). 
Irrespective of their quantitative differences, however, the universal 
applicability of quantum-like theories to any domain in which the replies to 
experimental solicitations depend on their order, strongly suggests that these 
theories are mostly that: a general procedure for anticipating probabilistically 
the replies to context-dependent experimental solicitations. They are likely to 
offer little help (if any) in the quest of a faithful representation of some 
independent reality out there, behind phenomena. 
There is also a well-known philosopher of quantum mechanics, who 
previously held a subtle realist interpretation of this theory, and who now 
considers that acknowledging the impossibility of a realist interpretation is a 
condition for the understanding of this theory. This is Richard Healey. His 
analysis is exceptionally lucid, even though he sometimes balks at its ultimate 
consequences (possibly a remnant of his former realist self). According to 
Healey (2017, p. X), “The main barrier to understanding quantum mechanics 
is not our inability to imagine the world it describes, but the presumption that 
it be understood as describing the world”. In other terms, the feeling that 
quantum mechanics is still mysterious one century after its first formulation, 
might well be due to our refusal to accept its non-representational status. 
Healey thus classifies the many approaches of quantum physics into two 
(unequal) subsets: those held by the interpreters (the majority by far) and those 
held by the pragmatists (a minority). Both approaches agree that there is 
something exceptional in quantum physics, but disagree about the nature of 
this exception. Interpreters try to figure out a picture of the universe or 
multiverse that may resemble Alice’s wonderland, but that fits more or less 
squarely with the formalism of quantum mechanics. Interpreters literally look 
for a proper “interpretation” of quantum mechanics. Pragmatists, instead, 
examine the use of the formalism, and they conclude that what is truly radical 




nothing like an account of the “universe”. Interpreters project the exceptional 
features of quantum physics onto their objects of thought, whereas pragmatists 
withdraw from projections and identify the source of this exceptionality in a 
revelation of the true workings of knowledge that was hidden by classical 
science. Interpreters are focused onto possible intentional objects, whereas 
pragmatists come back reflectively towards the condition of possibility of any 
knowledge of objects. Interpreters adopt a naturalist attitude, whereas 
pragmatists sketch a phenomenological attitude. To recapitulate, according to 
pragmatists, quantum physics needs no interpretation, but rather a clear 
recognition of the reason why there can be none. This is a motto that will be 
developed later in connection with the quest for an unconventional ontology 
that fits non-representational readings of quantum theories. 
3. Suspending the interpretations of quantum mechanics: a 
phenomenological epochè for physics 
What might be a non-interpretation of central symbols of quantum mechanics? 
The standard language of quantum physicists calls “states” certain vectors of a 
Hilbert space; it then presupposes that these symbols express the intrinsic state 
of real systems. Instead, in the pragmatist, non-interpretational approach to 
quantum physics, these vectors have no value as predicates of systems, but 
only a function for those who try to explore these so-called “systems”. The 
function of these vectors is to provide an informational bridge between the 
preparation and the outcome of experiments, or more generally (to borrow 
Healey’s terms) between the “backing condition and the advice condition” of 
each physical situation. To sum up, the said vectors of a Hilbert space are no 
absolute characteristics of systems, but rather predictive tools relative to each 
agent-situation.  
The latter deflationary way of featuring the so-called “state-vectors”, that no 
longer deserve to be called “states”, has been pushed even further by another 
approach to quantum physics (Fuchs et al. 2014): QBism, that can be read 
“Quantum Bayesianism” or “Quantum Bettabilitarianism”. QBism in its 
original form as quantum Bayesianism asserts that “state” vectors are a special 
variety of Bayesian probabilistic valuations, and that probabilistic valuations 
are logical constructs rather than physical realities. Here, “state” vectors and 
probabilistic valuations are not statements about what is the case, but 
statements about what each agent can reasonably expect to be the case. 
Ultimately, they are just expressions of what one subjectively expects to be the 
case; they express each subjective agent’s willingness to place bets on such 
and such outcome. Hence the alternative expression for QBism: “Quantum 
Bettabilitarianism”.  
Several features of these non-interpretational, non-committal approaches of 
quantum physics strongly evoke the phenomenological attitude.  
The first one is a deliberately first-person approach (be it first-person singular 




interpretational approaches to quantum mechanics is to reconstruct a new, self-
conscious, type of objective knowledge, starting everything afresh from the 
first-person standpoint of knowers and agents.  
The second common feature is the act of suspending judgment about a 
presumably external domain of objects, and the subsequent redirection of 
attention towards the mental or practical activity of constitution of these 
objects. In phenomenology, the suspension of judgment is called the epochè 
(after the Greek skeptics), and the redirection of attention towards the mental 
acts by which one comes to believe in the existence of perceived objects is 
called the phenomenological reduction. In QBism, and in Healey’s pragmatic 
approach as well, the suspension of judgment is also clear, since one here 
considers that no symbol of quantum mechanics refers to objects or denotes 
predicates of objects. The reflective redirection of attention is just as obvious, 
since now attention is redirected towards the epistemic function and the 
practical use of the symbols of quantum mechanics. In QBism, these symbols 
only represent the probabilistic weights that an agent can use to bet on the 
outcomes of experiments. And in Healey’s pragmatic approach, these symbols 
are relativized to various agent-situations, and their role is to be guides for 
agents, by giving rigorous prescriptions about how to set their beliefs.  
The third common feature, that is specifically developed by Laura de la 
Tremblaye (2020), is the very structure of quantum knowledge as understood 
by QBism and pragmatism. This structure combines a bundle of expectations, 
expressed by a state vector and an observable, with some rules to take concrete 
empirical outcomes into account for redefining the expectations (this is the 
famous “projection postulate”). Such a combination comes remarkably close 
to Husserl’s phenomenological theory of perception, with its horizons of 
expectations that can be fulfilled or disappointed by “intuitive contents” made 
of sensory hylè.  
4. Reconstituting ontology after the epochè 
But the central question I would like to raise goes beyond the level of structure 
to address the issue of ontology. Even if one adopts Richard Healey’s 
“pragmatist” approach, that is deliberately non-interpretational, there may be a 
way towards a sort of meta-interpretation of the situation that makes 
interpretational views so clumsy and so fraught with paradoxes. Even if one 
considers that quantum physics does not provide us with the smallest hint of a 
representation of the world, another question can still be asked: what should 
the world be like in order to display such resistance to being represented as an 
object of thought? Answering this question would be tantamount to 
formulating a new kind of ontology, a non-object-based ontology, an ontology 
of what cannot be represented as an object external to the representation itself. 
One may think of several candidates to the title of a truly alternative ontology. 
One of the most venerable is perhaps that of Schopenhauer. The very title of 




as Will and Representation. Here, the world is not something which must be 
represented. To a certain extent, it coincides with the lived representation 
itself; and yet it is more than this representation, since what representation 
pictorially expresses is the outcome of an obscure impulse that moves 
everything, and takes in us the form of desire and action: the Will. According 
to this conception, we are not facing the world, as our representation falsely 
suggests, but we coincide with the world qua dynamical process and inner 
impulse; and the representation is just a projection of the oriented power of 
this dynamical process. In Schopenhauer’s philosophy, Kant’s “thing in itself” 
assumes a non-conventional meaning. Schopenhauer’s “thing in itself” is not 
external to the knower but consubstantial with her. Then, the reason why, 
according to Schopenhauer (and possibly Kant), the “thing in itself” cannot 
become an object of knowledge, is precisely its lack of distance with respect to 
us. We tend to be blind to what is too close to our eyes. This is a first sketch of 
the kind of ontology that would fit a branch of physics such as quantum 
mechanics, in which the possibilities of separating the known object from the 
act of knowing are scarce (a feature that is well-known since Kochen & 
Specker’s theorem as “contextuality”). 
Now, other ontologies that have this special quality are phenomenological 
ontologies. I will not say much about Husserl’s methodologically idealist 
ontology. Let me just remind you that Husserl took the Cartesian doubt as a 
starting point. Then, he transformed this doubt into a universal epochè, or 
suspension of judgment about any claim of existence of wordly objects. And 
he retreated to the only domain of “apodictic certainty” of which any claim of 
inexistence would be performatively contradictory, namely the domain of 
“pure conscious life” (Husserl 1960, p. 21). By contrast, “all positions taken 
towards the already-given objective world”, said Husserl, must be “deprived 
of acceptance”, or “inhibited” (Husserl 1960, p. 20). The worlds of science 
and everyday life are then downgraded to the rank of mere phenomena that 
“claim being” (Husserl 1960, p. 18), whereas “pure conscious life” is raised to 
the rank of “the whole of absolute being” (Husserl 1982, §51). As I have 
mentioned above, this complete reversal of the ontological hierarchy is usually 
dismissed as a variety of idealism. Husserl somehow endorsed such a 
characterization of his philosophy as “idealist”, but he gave the latter word a 
performative rather than doctrinal acceptation. His “… idealism is not a 
metaphysical substruction ... but the only possible and absolute truth of an ego 
... recollecting itself on its own doing and its own ability to give meaning” 
(Husserl 2007, p. 48). Dogmatic idealism can then be seen as a reification of 
this performative idealism. It arises when one turns the phenomenological 
activity that consists of “recollecting” one’s own conscious life, and 
identifying the lived roots of one’s “natural” beliefs, into a thing (res 
cogitans). 
Would such a conservative ontology be an acceptable ontology for physics? I 
am not completely averse to it. After all, what else do we have in order to 




according to Husserl, is “the whole of absolute being”? Positions such as 
Bohr’s, who sometimes declared that the primary task of physics is to 
introduce some order within human experience, and Chris Fuchs’, whose 
slogan is “experience first”, should be considered as reasonable options, rather 
than being automatically dismissed as “solipsistic”.  
Yet, there is something specific to physics that is not easily encompassed 
within a methodological idealist ontology such as Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology: it is the role of embodiment and material agency that is so 
important in laboratories and industries. To a certain extent, Husserl himself 
was aware of this problem. This is why he dealt with embodiment in his Ideen 
II, and with what he called the lifeworld, the Lebenswelt, in his Crisis of the 
European Science. The lifeworld of history, of human work and instruments, 
includes the historically determined material agency to be found in 
laboratories. The phenomenological reduction to the lifeworld, after the world 
of theoretical idealizations has been suspended by the epoché, can be seen as 
an indispensible preliminary act before one performs the transcendental 
reduction that recollects us within the field of pure consciousness. A reduction 
to the lifeworld was tacitly performed by Bohr when he insisted that one 
should suspend any unified representation of the world, and take the 
formalism of quantum physics as just a “symbolic” anticipation of what can be 
found in the laboratory; and when he insisted that experimental apparatuses 
are to be described by using the ordinary language of our everyday life below 
the level of the quantum symbolism. But such a reduction to the lifeworld 
tends to be bypassed in the QBist approach to quantum mechanics. Indeed, the 
main difference between QBism and Bohr is the QBist’s explicit refusal of any 
intermediate domain between the explored environment and the experience of 
observing and believing.  
5. Within the flesh, within the world 
By contrast, embodiment and human agency are natively taken into account by 
the phenomenological ontologies of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Michel 
Henry. Let me start with Michel Henry, before I develop Merleau-Ponty’s 
position at length.  
According to Michel Henry (Henry 1985, Henry 2000, p. 72), any 
experience, including the experience of perceived objects, the experience of 
abstract forms, or the experience of one’s own mental acts, ultimately turns 
out to be nothing else than an experience of the self-affection of one’s own 
flesh. Pleasure and pain are taken as paradigmatic of self-affection, and even 
intentionality, even the assumption of transcendence of natural objects, must 
be (and is actually) rooted in the immanent impression that the flesh of a living 
being is making on itself. In other terms, even the perception of a patch of 
colour on some “outer” object is considered to be underpinned by a self-
perception of the perceiver. One could say, as some contemporary 
neurobiologists do, that a perception is a guided dream of our flesh (a dream 




mathematical structure can dispense with being rooted in some concrete self-
sensitive modality of the living. Intentional consciousness is borne by non-
intentional experience, and therefore the deepest layer of consciousness, the 
purest kind of experience, is nothing else than a naked self-sensitivity. Let me 
quote Michel Henry on this issue: “Original can only mean this: what comes 
in itself before any intentionality and independently of it, before the space of a 
gaze, before the ‘outside oneself’ of which intentionality is only a name; what 
comes … before the world, out of the world, foreign to any conceivable 
‘world’, a-cosmic” (Henry 2000, p. 82). In other terms, according to Michel 
Henry, what comes before intentionality, and before the belief in a world, is 
the non-directional impression of being there: the awareness of being 
embodied, without any notion of the separation between one’s own body and 
anything else; the silent voice of the body whose usual name is “cenesthesia”. 
But once again, unlike the naturalistic program, which would try to account 
for the latter impression in terms of some interaction between natural objects 
(say the cells and organs) belonging to the human body, the phenomenological 
program adopts the diametrically opposite stance. It starts from the deepest 
layer of what we experience, and then tries to justify the belief in a natural 
world as a consequence of the multifarious differentiations and felt limitations 
of such a primeval experience.  
This phenomenological program was developed and radicalized in 
Merleau-Ponty’s last and posthumous book, The Visible and the Invisible. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, “we can accept a world … only after having 
witnessed its arising from our experience of raw Being, which is like the 
umbilical cord of our knowledge, and our source of meaning” (Merleau-Ponty 
1964, p. 209). As a consequence, instead of looking for an ontology of 
separate observable objects (as in the natural sciences) or an extension of such 
an ontology that encompasses conceivable atoms of experience (as in 
panpsychism), Merleau-Ponty’s ontology is an ontology of immersion, of 
connivance, of acquaintance. Merleau-Ponty looks for an “oblique ontology” 
of intertwining (Saint-Aubert 2006), or, in his own terms, an “endo-ontology” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 279). This is an ontology expressed from the inmost 
recesses of the process of being, rather than an ontology of the external 
contemplation of beings. This is an ontology of radical situatedness: an 
ontology in which we are not onlookers of a nature given out there, but rather 
intimately intermingled with nature, somewhere in the midst of it (Merleau-
Ponty 1964, p. 152). Here, we cannot be construed as point-like spectators of 
what is manifest; instead, we are a field of experiences that merges with what 
appears in a certain region of it. This endo-ontology is therefore an ontology of 
the participant in Being, rather than an ontology of the observer of beings. In 
endo-ontology, Being is not presented before me as an object of sight, but my 
vision arises from the middle of Being. “Vision is the tool which allows me to 
be absent to myself, and to contemplate from within the fission of Being” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1985). This is a form of phenomenological embodied non-
dualism that was also expressed by Michel Henry (1963, p. 95): 




In Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, the archetypical element of our world that 
perfectly fits with an endo-ontology is our flesh. We perceive our flesh not as 
something separate, but as the perceiver that we are: a self-perceived 
perceiver. The flesh is that strange being endowed with complete reversibility, 
since it is jointly perceived and self-perceiving. The most obvious case of a 
two-faced kind of perception is the sense of touch, which, unlike distanced 
vision, is simultaneously appearance of what is touched and self-revelation of 
the touching in its carnal thickness. Here, two functions (toucher and touched) 
are realized by one and the same body. But this almost trivial remark was 
considered by Merleau-Ponty as paradigmatic of the true status of the whole 
world. “My” flesh is witness of the fundamentally fleshy nature of the world. 
“Where should we locate the boundary between the body and the world, 
Merleau-Ponty asks, since the world is flesh?” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 182). 
In an endo-ontological framework, there are no such things as “me”, “you”, 
and the world, but a single canvas wherefrom various self-individualizing 
centers of sensitivity emerge, and which leaves patches of elementarity and 
half-obscurity between these centers (Barbaras 1993, p. 304). The role of 
constituting objectivity, which had been entrusted to the transcendental ego by 
Husserl, and which had been extended to our own-body by Merleau-Ponty at 
the time of his Phenomenology of Perception, was further extended to 
whatever has the status of a flesh by Merleau-Ponty at the time of The Visible 
and the Unvisible. But since the flesh is boundless, since the flesh is the whole 
world, any division between the constituter of objectivity and the constituted 
objects is meaningless. Just as the flesh is self-perceiving, the world qua flesh 
is self-objectifying.  
6. Endo-ontology and participatory realism 
Merleau-Ponty’s “endo-ontology” strongly evokes the ontology that was 
elaborated by Chris Fuchs and other actors of the QBist adventure (despite the 
fact that their neglect of the intermediate level of bodies and instruments 
apparently brings them closer to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology than 
embodied phenomenology).  
Fuchs’ ontology was inspired by John Wheeler’s post-Bohrian idea that 
quantum mechanics involves “observer-participancy”. Just consider this 
sentence of Wheeler (2016): “The strange necessity of the quantum as we see 
it everywhere in the scheme of physics comes from the requirement that—via 
observer-participancy—the universe should have a way to come into being.” 
Observer-participancy was thus ascribed a very strong meaning and a crucial 
role by Wheeler. For, according to him, any act of observer-participancy is 
capable of creating the universe, including its past! Some of the naiveté of 
Wheeler “magical” retrospective creation of the universe by the observer’s 
gaze is avoided by Chris Fuchs’ participatory realism, but not all of it. Fuchs 
(2016) still uses the same word “creation” although in a more moderate form. 
He indeed accepts that each act of observer-participancy is a present act of 




living beings, in which something new (a child!) arises out of the combination 
of previous elements (the genetic material of the parents). Instead of 
“creation”, he could thus have used the more modest terms “emergence” or 
“co-generation”. 
The idea of participatory realism was born from Fuchs’ wish to distance 
himself somehow from Asher Peres (who was his first teacher and 
collaborator). Fuchs wished to escape the accusation of “instrumentalism” and 
to develop his non-conventional version of realism instead. Yet, Asher Peres’ 
endorsement of instrumentalism, and even positivism, is not necessarily to be 
understood as a philosophical rejection of participatory realism. It might well 
have been an overcautious statement of this very same doctrine. Consider the 
following key sentence in a joint paper of Peres and Fuchs (2000): “If the 
world is such that we can never identify a reality independent of our 
experimental activity, then we must be prepared for that, too”.  
From this sentence, one can adopt two strategies: 
1) The first strategy, which was adopted by Fuchs, consists in building an 
overarching metaphysics. It is tantamount to seeking a metaphysical reason for 
the lack of success of ordinary metaphysics. It is tantamount to saying that the 
lack of independence of the symbols and statements of quantum theories with 
respect to our situation and experience reveals something crucial about the 
nature of reality: that it is highly entangled, thoroughly holistic, and that 
therefore our knowledge of it can only be participatory rather than 
representational.  
2) The second strategy is anti-metaphysical. It is inspired by Wittgenstein’s 
famous prescription according to which “What we cannot speak about we 
must pass over in silence”. A defensor of this second strategy would express 
herself as follows. It is true that the characteristics of quantum mechanics 
irresistibly suggest that there is no such thing as a reality independent of us 
and our agency. But if this is so, the only thing we can do is renounce any 
representation or meta-representation, and devote our efforts to orienting 
ourselves and surviving in the putative participatory reality. We can hardly 
speak of what there is as if we were describing it from outside, for, in virtue of 
the very idea of a participatory reality, this would mean describing ourselves-
inside as if we were outside! Then, according to this strategy, instrumentalism 
is just silent participatory realism. 
A mischievous Wittgensteinian philosopher could insinuate that, conversely, 
participatory realism is noisy instrumentalism. But this might be an 
exaggeration. Participatory realism is truly useful, because it sketches the only 
conception of reality that is immediately compatible with quantum mechanics, 
and by doing so satisfies our want for mental pictures without indulging in 
wrong representations. Indeed, this mental picture is the only one that fully 




representations in quantum mechanics. It is a mental picture of the reason of 
the inadequacy of pictures. We could also say that participatory realism 
succeeds because it does not ascribe “reality” any positive predicate, but only 
a negative predicate: the impossibility of neatly splitting it into a spectator-like 
knower and a play-like known. This introduces us to what may be called 
“negative metaphysics”, similar to the famous (or infamous) “negative 
theology”.  In the same way as “negative theology” may be taken by some as a 
good reason to abstain from theology, “negative metaphysics” may be taken 
by some (the instrumentalists) as a good reason to abstain from metaphysics. 
7. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of quantum mechanics (1): beyond the 
classical paradigm 
Let’s recapitulate this point. Merleau-Ponty’s endo-ontology is an ontology for 
one who deeply participates in Being. And Chris Fuch’s participatory realism 
is a non-external variety of realism for one who is deeply immersed in reality. 
This remarkable analogy is supported by Merleau-Ponty himself. Indeed, fifty 
years before QBism was formulated as a radicalization of the philosophical 
tendency that was initially adumbrated by Bohr, Merleau-Ponty acknowledged 
the strong kinship between the epistemological situation of quantum 
mechanics and his phenomenology of embodiment. He did so in two texts that 
remained unpublished until after his death: Visible and invisible, and the 
Lectures on Nature he delivered during the years 1959-1960 at the Collège de 
France.  
Merleau-Ponty (1995, p. 117) started his reflection by noticing that, even in 
classical science where it seemed that the whole world could be treated as an 
object under a neutral and external gaze, there remained a huge blind spot. 
“Nature resists. It cannot be posited entirely before us. The body is a nature at 
work within us”.  The lived body, this double-faced natural reality, this felt 
locus of feelings, is averse to any conception of nature as a Big Object. Indeed, 
when we say that we “know” our own body, this is definitely not by taking it 
as an object of perception or thought, but by being acquainted with it, by 
coinciding with it, and by letting it self-reveal in our proprioceptive 
experience. Our own-body stubbornly resists objectification, and therefore the 
world of which it partakes resists universal objectification. Yet, classical 
science and even science to this day, did not completely renounce the project 
of universal objectification. As Merleau-Ponty pointed out, science tries to 
reabsorb its blind spot at any cost. “Science progressively reintroduces what it 
first excluded as subjective. But science wishes to reintroduce subjectivity as a 
special case of the relationships and objects that define the world according to 
it. Then, the world closes on itself, and except by what in us thinks and 
constructs science, we become parts of the big object” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 
p. 31). Even the domain of psychology becomes objectified if classical physics 
is taken as an ideal. (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 36). In other terms, the 
reabsorption of its own blind spot by scientific research is an ongoing project 




But this project implies (mis)taking mind and consciousness for parts of the 
“big natural object” called “the world”.  
However, a momentous episode of the history of science made this project 
obsolete even before its highly elusive completion. This episode is the advent 
of quantum mechanics. Indeed, quantum mechanics is simultaneously the most 
advanced stage of a long-term push towards objectivity, and the place where a 
fundamental limit of objectification manifests itself, though cryptically. 
Merleau-Ponty first notices that this manifestation of a fundamental limit of 
objectification is indeed so cryptic that “science has shown conservatism 
concerning the theory of knowledge” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 33). Scientists 
tried to modify the contents of their knowledge without modifying their 
conception of knowledge, and to modify their view of an objective world 
while maintaining their objectivist naturalism. The reason why scientists have 
taken this conservative stance is that, without even knowing it, science is 
“rooted in pre-science”; it is rooted in the pre-science of common sense. 
However, as Merleau-Ponty explains, no one can truly understand quantum 
mechanics without accepting a deep transformation of our conception of 
knowledge. It is in vain that “some physicists frame in an objectivist ontology 
a physics that is no longer amenable to it” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 45).  
Now, the suitable transformation of our conception of knowledge is deep and 
devastating. It is one that challenges nothing less than the notions of common 
sense and the very duality of subject and object. Let me quote Merleau-Ponty 
once more: “Quantum physics does not put all truths on the side of the 
‘subjective’, which would maintain the idea of an inaccessible objectivity. It 
rather challenges the very principle of this division and brings the contact 
between the observer and the observed in its very definition of ‘reality’” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 33). The new physics is then a strong incentive to 
recognize indirectly a truth that phenomenology knows directly: “that 
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ are domains hastily constructed out of a totalizing 
experience” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 38). 
On the basis of these remarks, Merleau-Ponty sketches the role of philosophy 
in our understanding of quantum mechanics. Philosophers, he says, can hardly 
take part in the technical debates about the formalism and its interpretation, let 
alone about experimental facts. But they become indispensible when 
“scientific being connects to pre-scientific being” (Merleau-Ponty 1995, p. 
125). Their work becomes crucial when one is concerned with the way 
scientific knowledge is elaborated out of the pre-scientific layer of the 
lifeworld, and thereby overrides this pre-scientific layer without being 
independent of it.  
However, when they pursue such an inquiry, philosophers are likely to make a 
disturbing discovery. By considering attentively the status of quantum 
mechanics, they discover that this physical theory only “helps us make 




impose an ontology … It has only the power to remove false evidence from 
their alleged status of ‘evidence’” (Merleau-Ponty 1995, p. 139-145). 
8. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of quantum mechanics (2): Probabilities 
This being said, Merleau-Ponty boldly entered into some details of the 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. He thus noticed that, in quantum 
physics, “(Probability) does not concern only our ignorance. With (quantum) 
indeterminism, we are dealing with pure probability … Probability here enters 
into the texture of reality” (Merleau-Ponty 1995, p. 127). But this very 
statement that “probability enters into the texture of reality” is not to be 
understood as a claim in favor of “objective probabilities”, similar to Popper’s 
propensions or Heisenberg’s potentialities. It must rather be understood by due 
consideration of the exceptional status of the wave function (or state vector) 
that allows one to calculate quantum probabilities. Notwithstanding their 
standard interpretation, wave functions are not a description of the state of an 
object. They rather describe the composite entity indissolubly made of a 
system, an apparatus and an observer (Merleau-Ponty 1995, p. 129). As a 
consequence, quantum probabilities do not reveal the ontological 
indeterminateness of the known objects out there; they rather express the 
indivisibility between the act of knowing and what is to be known.  
And yet, measurements are still interpreted as if they were measurements of 
something, as if they were measurements that provide us with information 
about the properties of something. This tension between indivisibility and a 
project of division is what generates the measurement problem, but also what 
has the potential to dissolve it.  
On the one hand, “The measurement operation, in wave mechanics, is an 
‘engaged’ operation. Every operation of the new mechanics is an operation in 
the world, which is never foreign to the act of the one who makes the 
measurement” (Merleau-Ponty 1995, p. 131). The situation in quantum 
mechanics is thus reminiscent of our situation of embodiment, of the special 
status of our own body as a bifacial “flesh”, and of the problem of knowing 
such an own-body: any operation of our own body is an operation within the 
“flesh of the world”. We can then consider that the situation in quantum 
mechanics is an extension of the archetypal case of the own-body, with its 
twofold power of touching and being touched, that generated the concept of an 
endo-ontology. This extension is in perfect agreement with Merleau-Ponty’s 
initial intuition. Indeed, according to him, the case of the flesh is paradigmatic 
of the true nature of the world, and the whole world should be treated as a big 
flesh rather than a big object. At the end of the day, quantum physics testifies 
that the world behaves as a big flesh, of which our flesh is a sample.  
But on the other hand, “the role of the observer is to cut the chain of statistical 
probabilities, to bring out an existence in action. What makes this existence 




measurement apparatus”. Only a thought can cut the chain of possibilities with 
probabilities and stop the chain at a point that is seen as an actuality; only a 
thought can cut the indivisible measurement chain, stop mentally the 
indivisible measurement dynamics, and interpret one aspect of this dynamics, 
one moment of the subject’s experience, as a well-defined actual outcome. 
After all, something similar arises from many contemporary interpretations of 
quantum mechanics, such as Rovelli’s “relational” interpretation: according to 
Rovelli, there is no fact of the matter about what is the “real” state of the 
system (a superposition or a sharp state) after a measurement has been 
performed. Here, what we still call the “state” is relative to a free option taken 
by the agent as to which epistemic situation she adopts (as a predictor or as an 
observer).  
This being granted, Merleau-Ponty pointed out that “the problem posed by 
quantum physics is close to the problem of perception. Its duality is 
reminiscent of the duality of the perceptual process, in turn global and 
attentive” (Merleau-Ponty 1995, p. 135). In particular, the duality between the 
global expectations expressed by superposed state vectors, and the local 
actualities brought out by an interpreted measurement, is reminiscent of the 
Husserlian duality between global perceptive horizons and focused sensory 
fulfillment of some of the expectations adumbrated by such a horizon. 
Epilogue  
Merleau-Ponty concludes his philosophical analysis of quantum physics by 
siding with a very remarkable (but unfortunately almost forgotten) French 
philosopher of physics of the mid-twentieth century: Paulette Destouches 
Février. He quotes her approvingly when she declares: “We are dealing with a 
human physics, a physics of solidarity. Yet, physics cannot be interpreted in a 
purely idealistic way. It requires a form of realism that can be called 
‘participatory’” (Merleau-Ponty, 1995, p. 135). Merleau-Ponty then recognizes 
explicitly that a good expression of his endo-ontology in quantum physics is 
the “participatory realism” advocated by Paulette Destouches-Février (1951).  
It then turns out that participatory realism, this view entertained by several 
philosophers of physics, from Paulette Destouches-Février to Christopher 
Fuchs, who dismiss any attempt at interpreting quantum mechanics as a 
possible representation of the world, is a perfect match to Merleau-Ponty’s 
endo-ontology of the world-flesh.  
Bibliography 
Aerts D. & Sozzo S. (2014), “Entanglement zoo II : examples in physics and 
cognition”,  In: H. Atmanspacher, E. Haven, K. Kitto, D. Raine (eds.), 
Quantum Interaction 2013, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8369, 
Springer, 2014 




Bell J.S. (1987), Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bitbol M. (1996), Schrödinger’s Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, 
Dortrecht: Kluwer. 
Bitbol M. (2009) (ed.), Théorie quantique et sciences humaines, Paris: CNRS 
Editions. 
Brukner C. & Zeilinger A. (2009), “Information Invariance and Quantum 
Probabilities”, Foundations of Physics 39, 677–689. 
Bruza P., Sofge D., Lawless W., van Rijsbergen C.J. & Klusch M. (eds.) 
(2009a), Quantum interaction, Berlin: Springer. 
Bruza P.D., Kitto K., Nelson D. & McEvoy C., (2009b), “Is there something 
quantum-like about the human mental lexicon?”, Journal of Mathematical 
Psychology, 53, 362-377. 
Destouches-Février P. (1951), La structure des théories physiques, P.U.F. 
Fuchs C.A. and A. Peres (2000) “Quantum theory needs no interpretation”, 
Physics Today, 3, 70-71. 
Fuchs C.A., N.D. Mermin, R. Schack (2014), “An Introduction to QBism with 
an Application to the Locality of Quantum Mechanics”, American Journal of 
Physics, 82, 749-754. 
Fuchs C. (2016), “On participatory realism”, ArXiv: 1601.04360v3 [quant-
ph]. 
Grinbaum A. (2007), “Reconstructing instead of interpreting quantum theory”, 
Philosophy of Science,74, 761-774. 
Healey R. (2017), The Quantum Revolution in Philosophy, Oxford University 
Press. 
Henry M. (1963), L’essence de la manifestation, Presses Universitaires de 
France. 
Henry M. (1985), Généalogie de la psychanalyse, Presses Universitaires de 
France. 
Henry M. (2000), Incarnation, Éditions du Seuil. 
Husserl E. (1960), Cartesian Meditations, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 





Husserl E. (2007), De la réduction phénoménologique, Jérôme Millon. 
Kant I. ([1770] 2004), Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, Whitefish: Kessinger 
Publishing 
Merleau-Ponty M. (1964), Le visible et l’invisible, Gallimard. 
Merleau-Ponty M. (1985), L’œil et l’esprit, Gallimard. 
Merleau-Ponty M. (1995), La nature, Notes. Cours du collège de France, 
Editions du Seuil. 
Saint-Aubert E. de (2006), Vers une ontologie indirecte: sources et enjeux 
critiques de l’appel à l’ontologie chez Merleau-Ponty, Vrin. 
Scheler M. (1993), Problèmes de sociologie de la connaissance, Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France. 
Schrödinger E. (1951), Science and Humanism, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Schrödinger E. (1954), Nature and the Greeks, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Stengers I. (1997), Cosmopolitiques 4 : Mécanique quantique, la fin du rêve, 
Paris: La Découverte. 
Thom R. (1993), Prédire n’est pas expliquer, Paris: Flammarion. 
Tremblaye, de la, L. (2020) “QBism from a phenomenological point of view”, 
in: H. Wiltsche & P. Berghofer, (eds.), Phenomenological approaches to 
physics, Berlin: Springer 
Tsirelson B., “Quantum analogues of the Bell inequalities. The case of two 
spatially separated domains”, Journal of Soviet Mathematics, 36, 557–570, 
1987 
Wheeler J.A. (1978), “The ‘Past’ and the ‘Delayed-Choice Double-Slit 
Experiment’”, in : A.R. Marlow (ed.) Mathematical Foundations of Quantum 
Theory, Academic Press. 
Wheeler J.A. (2016), Interview, quoted by C. Fuchs, “On participatory 
realism”, ArXiv: 1601.04360v3 [quant-ph]. 
Wittgenstein L. ([1953] 1968), Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
Zwirn H. (2009), “Formalisme quantique et préférences indéterminées en 
théorie de la décision”, in: M. Bitbol (ed.), Théorie quantique et sciences 




                
